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Abstract
Relative utility has become an important concept in several disjoint areas of economics.
We present a cardinal model of income utility based on the supposition that agents
care about their rank in the income distribution, and that utility is subject to adap-
tation over time. Utility levels correspond to the Leyden Individual Welfare Function
while utility di¤erences yield a version of the prospect theory value function, thereby
providing a new and shared derivation of each. We o¤er an explanation of some long-
standing paradoxes in the well-being literature, and an insight into the links between
relative comparisons and loss aversion.
JEL Classication: D60; D31; D81; I31
Keywords: relative utility; individual welfare function; rank; adaptation; prospect
theory; well-being.
1. Introduction
The idea that utility is relative, or reference-dependent, has recently permeated several
areas of economic thought. The supposition that outcomes are judged relative to socially
determined benchmarks such as societal averages (social-comparison) is the oldest form of
relativism, dating back to the Greek philosophy of Epicurus and the Stoics, and in the
economics literature to Veblen (1899). Empirical evidence of social-comparison in economics
is found in the context of income satisfaction (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Van Herwaarden et
al., 1977) and in subjective well-being (SWB) within countries (Blanchower and Oswald,
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2004; Luttmer, 2005; McBride, 2001).1 Social-comparison can be used to explain aspects of,
amongst other things, SWB data (Easterlin, 2001a), savings behaviour (Duesenberry, 1949),
and the desire for conformity (Clark and Oswald, 1998). There are important consequences
for economic policy, with the case for economic growth becoming less clear and the case for
progressive taxation stronger (Boskin and Sheshinki, 1978).
However, social-comparison appears to be only one prevalent form of relativism. Rather,
as noted as early as Marshall (1890, p. 86), people also engage in comparison with their
own past performance (self-comparison). Kapteyn et al. (1980) and Van der Stadt et al.
(1985) present evidence for self-comparison in the context of income satisfaction, while Clark
(1999) provides evidence from job satisfaction data. McBride (2001) nds evidence for both
self- and social-comparison in data from the 1994 General Social Survey. Otherwise puzzling
economic phenomena are also consistent with self-comparison. For instance, it can explain
the evidence of Frank and Hutchens (1993) and Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) that
people prefer an increasing income prole to a decreasing prole, even if both have the same
undiscounted payo¤, and therefore the increasing prole the lower present discounted value.
Frederick and Loewensteins (1999) review of adaptation contains many further examples.
Self-comparison plays a prominent role in several literatures, most notably consumption
(under the name of habit formation). Signicant theoretical contributions to this literature
include Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Constantinides (1990).
An implication of self-comparison is that utility is dependent upon the rate of change in
income, not only the level of income (see Hsee and Abelson, 1991). A consequence is that
the same level of income can yield di¤erent levels of utility, depending upon the level of
previous income. Second, the impulse response function of utility in response to an income
shock will initially over-shoot its long-run level. This e¤ect, a lagged adaptation of utility to
income shocks, is widely observed. Di Tella et al. (2005) cannot reject the null hypothesis
of full adaptation to income after 4 years. Clark et al. (2003) report varying degrees of
adaptation of SWB to marriage, divorce and unemployment. Few doubt that winning a
lottery or losing a limb initially provoke euphoria or despair. However, what evidence we
have suggests that long-run well-being is much less inuenced (Brickman et al., 1978; Oswald
and Powdthavee, 2006). Third, if adaptation to all determinants of SWB is complete, as
supposed by some psychologists, humans may simply be trapped on a hedonic treadmill
(Brickman and Campbell, 1971).
The literature on non-expected utility theory also embraces the idea that lottery outcomes
are judged relative to a reference level, with this being a feature of its principal theory:
(cumulative) prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
Although not formally identied, the conventional interpretation of the reference level in this
1Other disciplines have long studied social-comparison. In sociology, the relative deprivation theory of
Runciman (1966) assumes that people compare themselves with others, and feel relatively deprived when
others have what they desire. In social psychology, social-comparison is repeatedly shown to inuence SWB
(e.g. Brickman and Bulman, 1977; Emmons and Diener, 1985).
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literature is the status quo position. However, K½oszegi and Rabin (forthcoming) explore a
version of the model that identies the reference level with the prior expectation of an
outcome.
The various literatures on income satisfaction, SWB, and non-expected utility theory
contain a number of independent approaches to the form of the income utility function. Two
examples are the Individual Welfare Function (IWF) of Van Praag (1968, 1971) and the value
function of prospect theory. Despite similar assumptions on the cardinality of utility across
these literatures, so far little attention has been paid to possible linkages among concepts.
Second, despite the fact that self- and social-comparison are typically found within the same
domains, theoretical work has tended to focus exclusively on only a single form of relativism.
We attempt to build a model of cardinal utility based upon the two notions of self-
and social-comparison. It is argued that social-comparison arises from a concern for ranked
position in the income distribution. Self-comparison generates a process of adaptation to
income over time. For analysis of utility levels we show that a special case of the model
coincides with the IWF of Van Praag (1968, 1971). Second, we show that the model o¤ers
an explanation of well-known paradoxes in the literature on national and international well-
being. We contrast our account of these paradoxes with those of Easterlin (2001a). Third,
when we analyse the rst di¤erence of utility between consecutive periods we establish a
version of the value function of prospect theory. Our value function is reference-contingent
in the sense that it is di¤erent for each reference level of income. We show how loss aversion
may be generated by a concern for relative income.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 motivates the main economic and psycho-
logical concepts behind our approach. Section 3 presents the model. In Section 4 we analyse
the Leyden IWF, paradoxes in the literature on SWB, and the value function of prospect
theory. In Section 5 we calibrate a version of the model to assess the particular form of
reference-contingency implied by our value function, and the extent of loss aversion. Section
6 concludes.
2. Relative Utility
2.1. Reference Levels
In a well-known contribution, Van Praag (1968) begins from the supposition that people have
a lower (worst) income level Ymin and an upper (best) income level Ymax, with U (Ymin) = 0
and U (Ymax) = 1.
2 Agents are taken to compare income levels relative to these two extreme
levels.
2The same idea is used by Dhillon and Mertens (1999) in their relative utilitarian social welfare function.
Parduccis (1963) range-frequency theory is also based on two reference levels and a bounded [0; 1] satisfaction
scale.
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Our point of departure from Van Praags approach is his assumption that the upper and
lower reference levels are xed and abstract best and worst levels. Instead, we reinterpret
the lower reference level as corresponding to a particular verbal label, for instance, the
level of income that would be said to be minimum, assuming this amount to be less than
current income. Similarly, we reinterpret the upper reference level as the level of income
that would be said to be very good, or excellent, assuming this to be greater than current
income. A small but growing literature studies the empirical properties of income levels
that correspond to particular verbal labels. This literature must be evaluated with caution,
since some inter-personal di¤erences must surely reect idiosyncratic variations in semantic
expression. Nevertheless were variation purely random, we would not expect to observe the
systematic relations with own income we now describe.
The Leyden group of economists have over many years employed the Income Evaluation
Question, in which people are asked to state income levels that they perceived as su¢cient,
bad, etc. Their results are supportive of relativity in utility. For instance, the income
level perceived su¢cient or good has an elasticity with current income of around 0.6 (Van
Herwaarden et al., 1977; Van Praag, 1993; Van Praag and Van der Sar, 1988). Similar
results are found for minimum income by Stutzer (2003, 2004) and for get along income
by Rainwater (1974). Time-series data from Gallup Polls conducted since 1946 display a
positive inter-temporal elasticity between mean get along income and mean disposable
income that is estimated at 0.6 by Kilpatrick (1973) and at unity by Rainwater (1974, 1994).
A common nding in these studies is that mean minimum or su¢cient income is less
than mean household income for the sample. This suggests that most households are above
their perceived su¢cient or minimum level. The mean income level deemed good or very
good exceeds mean household income for the sample. This is consistent with the upper and
lower reference levels lying respectively above and below current income.
2.2. Modelling Self- and Social-Comparison
Following the lead of Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001), we argue that the two reference levels,
which we collectively term the frame of reference, reect the processes of self- and social-
comparison.3 We model di¤erences in the frame of reference across people using the concept
of social-comparison. We use self-comparison as a means to model the dynamics of the frame
of reference over time. Two approaches in the literature propose why people might optimally
desire social information. The rst (e.g. Samuelson, 2004) stresses informational advantages,
while the second (e.g. Cole et al., 1992, 1995, 2001) stresses the importance of status or rank
in determining access to non-market goods such as mates.
Recent experimental and empirical results provide support for the importance of rank
position. For instance, Brown et al. (2005) nd that income satisfaction exhibits rank
3Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) also argue that expectations should be taken into account. For instance,
an individual might have higher income aspirations if they are expecting the economy to boom, relative to
if they are expecting a slump. However, for simplicity, we do not develop this aspect here.
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dependence in questionnaire data of UK employees. Evidence from Whitehall studies of
British civil servants suggests that rank is protective against a wide range of human diseases
(Marmot, 2004; Marmot et al., 1984). Frank (1985b) o¤ers a neurobiological account of such
results, emphasising the relationship between relative position and the neurotransmitter
serotonin. Psychologists have been aware of the role of rank in satisfaction judgements
since Parduccis (1963, 1965) range-frequency theory, which models the satisfaction of a
given income from within a contextual set of other incomes as a compromise between its
ordinal rank in the contextual set (frequency component) and its magnitude relative to
the minimum and maximum incomes in the contextual set (range component). A growing
literature in economics considers the implications of a concern for rank on human behaviour
and economic policy (e.g. Becker et al., 2005; Frank, 1985a; Layard, 1980; Robson, 1992).
We follow these authors in modelling relative income as the relative rank of an income in
the income distribution.
Precursors in the economic literature on self-comparison emphasise the role of recency:
more recent events are more important to the current frame of reference. Psychologists,
however, also note the disproportionate inuence of extreme experiences in framing the
perception of subsequent events. Tversky and Gri¢n (1991) and Kahneman and Varey
(1991) note that experiences have a direct (endowment) e¤ect on well-being, but also an
indirect (contrast) e¤ect, through the changed evaluation of subsequent events. The contrast
e¤ect is argued to dominate the endowment e¤ect for extreme experiences. This leads Myers
(1992, p. 63) to argue that if extremely good experiences are rare, people might actually be
better o¤ without them.
Psychologists refer to the prolonged use of past extreme stimuli as bounds against which
to evaluate current stimuli as end-anchoring. Several studies uncover direct evidence of end-
anchoring using responses to discrete shifts in the range of a stimulus (Haubensak, 2000,
2001; Parducci, 1992, 1995; Tomassi, 2001). Our approach attempts to model both the
end-anchoring and recency dimensions to self-comparison.
3. A Model of the Utility of Income
3.1. Experienced Utility
Suppose we have an innity of agents. Let each agents period t income be denoted Yt > 0,
where periods are discrete and t = 1, ..., T . In period t, each agent possesses an endogenous
upper reference level HEt ≥ Yt and an endogenous lower reference level 0 < LEt ≤ Yt.4
Following Kahneman et al. (1997) we dene experienced utility as the ex-post hedonic
quality associated with a given income level within a given income distribution. We suppose
4To our knowledge, the idea of endogenising both reference levels is new. In a di¤erent context, March
(1988) o¤ers a model of adaptive risk preferences featuring a xed lower reference level and an endogenous
upper reference level. Versions of his model are employed in the behavioural literature on management
decision-making (see e.g. Shapira, 1995; Sullivan and Kida, 1995).
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that experienced utility reects the balance of current income relative to that perceived
su¢cient and that perceived good. This gives us experienced utility as
UE
 
Yt, L
E
t , H
E
t
 ≡ Yt − LEt
HEt − LEt
. (1)
Were the reference levels xed experienced utility would be linear in income. However, as the
frame of reference adjusts endogenously with income, experienced utility is typically non-
linear in income. Following Van Praag (1968) we take UE () to be cardinally measurable.5
An obvious objection to this formulation is that it neglects entirely the possibility of
absolute utility. However, to keep the model simple we shall ignore the possibility of absolute
utility, even though we believe it to exist. International studies of SWB reliably document
a threshold of average national income above which average national income is uncorrelated
with average national well-being. The value of this threshold is estimated at $5,000 (in
1995, PPP) by Frey and Stutzer (2002). A similar gure is suggested by Murray (1988) and
Diener and Diener (1995, Fig. 1). Since most citizens of developed countries lie above this
threshold, our model may be a reasonable approximation in such cases.
Individual incomes evolve according to a stochastic income accumulation equation. In
every period t = 1, ..., T each agents income is subject to a random income shock εt with
mean  ≥ 0 and variance σ2. These parameters, and the income accumulation equation
are assumed to be known by all agents. The income accumulation equation and income
shock implicitly dene a long-run income density. At time t we denote this ft (Y ), and its
distribution function we denote as Ft (Y ). The distribution function is a relative rank that
assigns the highest income unity, and the lowest income zero. We shall use the term relative
income to refer to F (Y ).
The role of social-comparison is summarised by the construction in each period of two
relative indicator levels (RILs), which we denote by the pair
 
lEt , h
E
t

, where 0 < lEt ≤ Yt
and hEt ≥ Yt. The RILs for period t summarise an agents absolute and relative income
position at time t, but contain no information from before time t. We formalise this by
dening
 
lEt , h
E
t

as functions of absolute and relative income:
lEt = l (Yt, Ft (Yt)) ; h
E
t = h (Yt, Ft (Yt)) .
For point-in-time phenomena, the reference levels Lt and Ht can be assumed equivalent to lt
and ht. However, as we shall model the value function of prospect theory as a through-time
phenomenon, we must allow for the frame of reference at time t to be inuenced by events
occurring before time t. We therefore introduce the process of self-comparison, in a manner
that emphasises the importance to the frame of reference of extreme events. Suppose each
agent is able to store information in working memory information from the present period
5The technical assumption we require is that of cardinal measurability and unit comparability. This is
the coarsest measurability condition that enables the application of a utilitarian social welfare function.
6
and the previous n periods. At time t, the memory set containing all present and past
information known to the agent is given by It =

lEt , l
E
t−1, ..., l
E
t−n, h
E
t , h
E
t−1, ..., h
E
t−n
	
. The
frame of reference is constructed from the memory set as
LEt = min
 
lEt , l
E
t−1, ..., l
E
t−n

; HEt = max
 
hEt , h
E
t−1, ..., h
E
t−n

.
As n→∞ an agent remembers every previous RIL and is not subject to adaptation e¤ects.
If n = 0 an agent is said to adapt instantaneously. When n > 0 a RIL may never be adopted
as a reference level if it is always overshadowed by other, more extreme, RILs in the memory
set.
Holding relative income constant, we endow experienced utility with monotonicity in
absolute income. Su¢cient conditions for this are that
∂lEt
∂Yt
|Ft(Yt)=c < 1 and ∂h
E
t
∂Yt
|Ft(Yt)=c < 1.
As a necessary condition, at least one of these inequalities must hold. However, we make
no assumption that experienced utility is monotonic in absolute income if relative income is
not held constant. If an agent receives a positive income shock, but one that is su¢ciently
small that relative income falls, then experienced utility may fall.
Second, holding absolute income constant, we suppose experienced utility is increasing
in relative income. Su¢cient conditions for this are that
∂lEt
∂Ft()
|Yt=c < 0 and ∂h
E
t
∂Ft()
|Yt=c < 0.
As a necessary condition, at least one of these inequalities must hold. Third, in light of the
evidence on income levels that correspond to verbal labels we suppose that, holding relative
income constant, the RILs
 
lEt , h
E
t

are increasing in absolute income:
∂lEt
∂Yt
|Ft(Yt)=c > 0,
∂hEt
∂Yt
|Ft(Yt)=c > 0.
3.2. Decision Utility
Again following Kahneman et al. (1997) we introduce the notion of decision utility, which
refers to the ex-ante expectation of experienced utility. We do this to consider concepts such
as the value function of prospect theory, which is a decision utility used to choose between
risky prospects. We model decision utility by supposing the agent predicts experienced
utility in period t at t − 1 under the Cournot assumption that the income distribution at
t− 1 is xed. We have then that
UD
 
Yt, L
D
t , H
D
t
 ≡ Yt − LDt
HDt − LDt
. (2)
where
lDt = l (Yt, Ft−1 (Yt)) ; L
D
t = min
 
lDt , l
E
t−1, ..., l
E
t−n

;
hDt = h (Yt, Ft−1 (Yt)) ; H
D
t = max
 
hDt , h
E
t−1, ..., h
E
t−n

.
Clearly, only if the income distribution does not change between periods, i.e. Ft−1 () = Ft (),
does the Cournot assumption actually obtain, in which case decision and experienced utility
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coincide. More generally, for a given absolute income Y , our restrictions imply the following
inequalities must hold:
lEt ≥ lDt ⇔ hEt ≥ hDt ⇔ Ft−1 (Y ) ≥ Ft (Y ) . (3)
3.3. A Simple Model
We now outline a simple and tractable specication of the model that we shall consider in
what follows. First, we specify the formation of the RILs l () and h () as
l (Y, F (Y )) = Y − g (Y )F (Y ) ,
h (Y, F (Y )) = Y + g (Y ) [1− F (Y )] ,
where g (Y ) is a positive-valued and increasing function 0 < g (Y ) < Y dened for all Y > 0
with 0 < g′ (Y ) < 1.6 Note that g (Y ) can be interpreted as the di¤erence between hEt and
lEt since h ()− l () = g (Y ). Two examples illustrate some possibilities for g (Y ). First, g(Y )
can be assumed to grow linearly in income, in which case g (Y ) = λY , where 0 < λ < 1.
Concavity can be introduced by setting g (Y ) = log (1 + Y ).
Second, we suppose n = 1. This choice is su¢cient to allow for adaptation e¤ects, without
encumbering the analysis with additional lagged variables. These two assumptions lead to
a model with utility functions given by (1) and (2), with
lEt = Yt − g (Yt)Ft (Yt) ; LEt = min
 
lEt , l
E
t−1

;
hEt = Yt + g (Yt) [1− Ft (Yt)] ; HEt = max(hEt , hEt−1);
lDt = Yt − g (Yt)Ft−1 (Yt) ; LDt = min
 
lDt , l
E
t−1

;
hDt = Yt + g (Yt) [1− Ft−1 (Yt)] ; HDt = max(hDt , hEt−1).
4. Analysis
4.1. Leyden IWF
The Leyden IWF (Van Praag, 1968) identies the income utility function as coinciding with
the log-normal distribution function. To analyse this idea, we rst dene the notion of
steady-state at time t to be the case where the income shock is turned o¤, such that all
agents receive a shock εt = 0. In this case it holds that Ft (Y ) = Ft−1 (Y ) for all agents.
While not intended to be realistic, steady-state is the easiest state of the model to analyse,
since both the e¤ects of an agents own past income and the e¤ect of changes in other agents
incomes are abstracted from. We are then in a position to state our rst Proposition (all
proofs being in the Appendix).
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose:
6The condition g (Y ) < Y is su¢cient to ensure that l () is always positive. The condition g′ () < 1
guarantees that
 
lEt ; h
E
t

are increasing in absolute income, holding relative income constant.
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i) Incomes evolve according to Gibrats Law (Gibrat, 1931):
Yt = (1 + εt)Yt−1,
with Y0 = 1 for all agents.
ii) εt is iid across agents and drawn from a normal distribution (truncated to guarantee
log Yt always exists) with mean  ≥ 0 and variance σ2.
Then steady-state experienced utility is approximately the log-normal distribution func-
tion:
UE
 
Yt, L
E
t , H
E
t |εt = 0

=
1
σ
√
2πt
Z log Yt
−∞
e−
(z−t)2
2σ2t dz.
If we are prepared to rely on asymptotic theory, the income shock in Proposition 1 may be
generalised to any iid shock with nite mean and variance. Proposition 1 is easily understood
when it is realised that steady-state experienced utility is simply
UE
 
Yt, L
E
t , H
E
t |εt = 0

= Ft (Yt) .
The two requirements of the Proposition merely guarantee that the distribution function of
income is log-normal. Note that since experienced and decision utilities coincide in steady-
state, Proposition 1 also holds for decision utilities. This parallels the treatment of Van
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) who dene both a decision and experienced version of
the IWF, both of which are log-normal.
Despite the similarities, there are notable di¤erences between our model and the Leyden
IWF. First, in our model experienced utility only coincides exactly with the log-normal dis-
tribution function in the special case that the model is in steady-state. Nevertheless, results
from the calibrated model in Section 5 suggest that the log-normal distribution function is
a close approximation to experienced utility after allowing for plausible amounts of income
growth. Consistent with this, Leyden authors nd empirical support for the log-normal
formulation (e.g. Van Praag, 1971; Van Praag et al., 1978; Van Praag and Kapteyn, 1973).
Second, Van Praags (1968) derivation of the IWF is based on a two-stage budgeting
process, in which the consumer rst allocates money across commodity groups and subse-
quently within each commodity group. By examining a commodity group containing a large
number of commodities, and employing a number of restrictive assumptions, the author in-
vokes the central limit theorem to obtain the desired result. Several aspects of this approach
are the subject of a critique by Seidl (1994). In contrast, our derivation emphasises that
experienced utility takes the form of the distribution function of income. The log-normal
form emerges as a consequence of its close approximation to empirically observed income
distributions. In this respect our model is more similar with the preference formation theory
of Kapteyn (1977) and a cognitive model of utility by Kornienko (2004).
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Third, the approaches di¤er in interpretation of  and σ. In our model (, σ) are summary
properties of the entire income distribution. Conversely, Leyden authors interpret (, σ) as
psychological parameters specic to the individual. The parameter  is perceived as a want
parameter, while σ is interpreted as a measure of welfare sensitivity.
4.2. Subjective Well-Being
SWB is a broad notion of utility, and its determinants need not be economic in nature.
Nevertheless, income appears as an important explanatory variable in studies of well-being,
such that we feel it possible to extend our model to that literature. Easterlin (2001a)
identies three apparently paradoxical ndings that permeate existing research on SWB
within and across countries. First, the cross-section nding: well-being is positively related
to income within countries (Argyle, 1999; Easterlin, 1974, 1995, 2001b). Second, the time-
series nding: at least for developed countries, as the income of a nation rises, SWB typically
remains unchanged (Blanchower and Oswald, 1999; Diener and Oishi, 2000; Easterlin 1974,
1995; Kenny, 1999). Third, people typically think that their well-being will improve in the
future, and that their present well-being is higher than in the past (Cantril, 1965; Lipset
and Schneider, 1987). To these we add a fourth e¤ect, evidence for which we have already
presented, that the well-being yielded by an given income level depends upon the level of
prior income.
While a standard increasing income utility function can easily accommodate the cross-
section e¤ect, it struggles to deal with the conjunction of the cross-section and time-series
e¤ects. The third nding appears to contradict the second, since if everyones well-being is
rising over time, so ought to be average national well-being. The fourth nding is inconsistent
with the standard income utility function since it implies that the same income level can, in
di¤erent circumstances, yield di¤erent levels of utility.
The experienced utility function (1) and associated restrictions guarantee that experi-
enced utility is increasing in relative income. Therefore, the cross-section nding within
countries is generated in the standard economic manner. Second we turn to Easterlins
time-series nding. To examine this, we dene the utilitarian average of experienced utility
(social welfare) as
WE ≡
Z
UE
 
Yt, L
E
t , H
E
t

dFt (Yt) .
It is well-known that social welfare is constant in a model in which experienced utility is
proportional to the distance between an agents income and the mean income. However,
the notion of rank also possesses such a zero-sum property since one persons increase in
rank must come at the expense of anothers decrease. This idea underpins the following
Proposition on steady-state social welfare:
PROPOSITION 2. Steady-state social welfare is independent of the mean and variance of
the income distribution, taking a value of precisely 1
2
.
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Given Proposition 2 there can be no time trend in average steady-state experienced utility.
However, the presence of income growth can prevent the model from entering steady-state,
thereby holding social welfare above the steady-state level. Importantly however, income
growth rates a¤ect only social welfare levels. In the case of a country with long-run growth
rates uctuating around a balanced path growth rate, as would appear to characterise most
major economies (Landon-Lane and Robertson, 2002), the model predicts no systematic
time trend in social welfare. The only circumstance in which average well-being exhibits
a time-trend is if growth rates themselves are increasing or decreasing over time: positive
well-being trends are associated with accelerating income growth.
It may be instructive to compare our explanation of these two ndings to that of Easterlin
(2001a). Rather than have all agents begin with the same income, Easterlin argues that
agents begin with di¤erent incomes but similar reference levels. Therefore, at the beginning
of the life-cycle there is a positive association between income and well-being. Second, he
argues that the frame of reference moves one-for-one with increases in income, such that well-
being always remains at its original level. The possibility of such one-for-one adjustment in
our account is ruled out by the assumption g′ () > 0.
Easterlin guarantees the absence of time trends in average well-being by forcing each
individual agents well-being to be constant over time irrespective of the time-path of ab-
solute and relative income. We, however, allow individual well-being to change over time
as a function of absolute and relative income, but place a zero-sum restriction only on the
aggregate. Second, Easterlins account rules out trends in average well-being entirely, while
our model predicts a circumstance under which they can exist.
We now turn to Easterlins third nding. To analyse this we relax the assumption of
steady-state. We retain the assumption of a common shock at time t, though now we allow
it to be non-zero. Changes in income rank remain abstracted from, for relative income is
unchanged at time t for all agents: Ft−1 (Yt−1) = Ft (Yt). We then have Proposition 3:
PROPOSITION 3. If the common income shock is positive (incomes are growing over
time), then the (ex-ante) decision utility of an income level Yt always exceeds the (ex-post)
experienced utility:
UD
 
Yt, L
D
t , H
D
t

> UE
 
Yt, L
E
t , H
E
t

.
Proposition 3 o¤ers an account of why people tend to believe they will be happier in the
future than at present, yet appear to get no happier according to aggregate data. Although
essentially the explanation o¤ered by Easterlin himself, from the formalisation it is now
apparent that what di¤erentiates the notions of decision and experienced utility is the posi-
tional externality discussed extensively in Frank (1985a, 1997). Positional externalities are
the negative externality that an increase in one agents income imposes on the income utility
of all other agents. The mechanism here is the dependence of each agents frame of reference
11
on rank in the income distribution. Decision utility fails to take positional externalities into
account, and therefore exceeds experienced utility whenever they are present.
Finally, we turn to the fourth nding on the e¤ects of own income. To isolate the role of
self-comparison we again suppose that at time t all agents receive a common income shock.
We then have the following Proposition:
PROPOSITION 4. Experienced utility is above its steady-state level in the period after an
increase in income and below its steady-state level in the period after a decrease in income:
UE
 
Yt, L
E
t , H
E
t |εt ≷ 0

≷ UE
 
Yt, L
E
t , H
E
t |εt = 0

.
Proposition 4 is an immediate consequence of adaptation to income shocks. The lower
reference level takes a period to adjust to an increase in income, so utility initially lies above
the steady-state level. In the case of a decease in income it is the upper reference level that
takes a period to adjust.
4.3. Prospect Theory
We now extend our model to the behavioural literature on decision-under-risk. Here the ap-
propriate notion of utility is that of decision utility: to evaluate a gamble in advance requires
an ex-ante prediction of the experienced utility corresponding to each payo¤. Prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) is the dominant descriptive
model of decision-under-risk, and is used to explain a number of economic phenomena, in-
cluding the endowment e¤ect (Kahneman et al., 1990; Knetsch, 1989), the equity premium
puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995), and consumption smoothing (Bowman et al., 1999).
As applied to income, prospect theory denes a value function V KT (Y ;YR) endowed
with the following properties (Figure 1). First, the carriers of utility are argued to be changes
in income (Y ) around an exogenous reference income YR. Outcomes Y ≥ 0 are termed
gains, and outcomes Y < 0 are termed losses. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) describe the
value function as being like a book, with each page describing V KT () at a di¤erent reference
income, though they fail to formally develop this point. We term this book-like property
reference-contingency. Second, utility is steeper in the loss domain than in the gain do-
main

∂V KT (−Y ;YR)
∂Y
>
∂V KT (Y ;YR)
∂Y
for all Y > 0

, which they term loss aversion. Third,
marginal utility is a decreasing function in distance from the reference income (diminishing
sensitivity). Diminishing sensitivity implies that the utility of income is concave for gains
and convex for losses. The conjunction of loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity implies a
kink-point at the reference income level.
In principle a standard concave utility function U(Y ) can be used to construct a reference-
dependent utility function given by
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UR (Y ;YR) ≡ U (YR +Y )− U (YR) .
By the (strict) concavity of U () we have that ∂UR(−Y ;YR)
∂Y
>
∂UR(Y ;YR)
∂Y
for all Y > 0,
so UR () exhibits loss aversion. However, UR () cannot generate diminishing sensitivity,
for it is everywhere concave. When agents evaluate gambles in which they stand to lose a
large percentage of their income (the case of ruin), absolute utility of income would likely
dominate relative concerns. Arguably, in these cases where absolute utility e¤ects are likely
to be strong, the concavity of the absolute utility function can account for loss aversion: we
do not need a theory of relative utility to explain loss aversion for those su¢ciently near the
ruin point. The puzzle is to explain loss aversion in agents far from the ruin point where we
suppose absolute e¤ects to be weak. To address this issue we therefore focus on the relative
component of the value function, though we comment on the e¤ects of including an absolute
component.7
To simplify some aspects of the problem we suppose the frame of reference is scaled in
income. This implies g (Y ) = λY , where 0 < λ < 1. Let us now introduce our value
function V [], which is simply the rst di¤erence between the decision utility of income in
period t (the period t−1 prediction of experienced utility in period t) and experienced utility
in period t− 1:
V () ≡ UD(Yt, LDt , HDt )− UE(Yt−1, LEt−1, HEt−1).
Since both UD () and UE () are bounded on the unit interval, the value function is bounded
on the interval [−1, 1]. As the value function is everywhere non-decreasing in εt and bounded,
it can be shown that as εt ↓ −1 the value function is convex and converging to linear.
Similarly, as εt → ∞ the value function is concave and converging to linear. Proposition
5 states that we can always have the value function concave for small εt ≥ 0, though the
possibility of a convex region for some intermediate values of εt exists:
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose εt ≥ 0, then there exists a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that the value
function is concave at εt = 0. Conditional on parameter values, the value function may
either be concave throughout the gain domain or may contain a convex interval.
Now suppose that εt < 0. Proposition 6 states that for negative income shocks the
value function is initially convex, though again the possibility of a concave interval for some
intermediately large negative shock exists:
7Köbberling and Wakker (2005) propose am alternative denition of loss aversion according to which
UR () displays loss aversion if and only if limY ↑0 ∂U
R(Y ;YR)
∂Y > limY ↓0
∂U
R(Y ;YR)
∂Y . If U () is a smooth
concave absolute utility function then UR () does not satisfy this condition and our argument no longer
holds. However, our relative component of the value function is kinked by construction, and therefore always
satises this alternative denition of loss aversion without recourse to absolute utility.
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PROPOSITION 6. Suppose εt < 0, then there exists a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that the value
function is convex as εt ↑ 0. Conditional on parameter values, the value function may either
be convex throughout the loss domain or may contain a concave interval.
In tandem, Propositions 5 and 6 imply a kink-point at the reference level of income.
While Kahneman and Tverskys (1979) formalisation of the value function does not contain
either a concave region in the loss domain or a convex region in the gain domain, the authors
nevertheless note (p. 279) that such regions are possible. They emphasise the possibility
of concave regions for large losses, since such losses often necessitate changes in lifestyle.
Concavity for large losses is not a feature of the relative component of the value function,
but does emerge if a concave absolute component is also allowed for. Near the ruin point
the relative component of the value function is approximately linear so the concavity of the
absolute component is likely to dominate. More generally, the addition of a concave absolute
component reduces the likelihood of observing convex regions for gains, and increases the
likelihood of observing a concave region in the loss domain.8
A di¤erence between our value function and that of prospect theory is that when indi-
vidual income is evolving the value function does not intersect the origin. In particular, if
εt−1 > 0 the value function intersects below the origin, and if εt−1 < 0 it intersects above
the origin. The reason for this is that income utility is initially above or below its long-run
(steady-state) level after a change in income. The e¤ect being captured is the lagged process
of adaptation to the income change at time t− 1.
Several sources of loss aversion can be identied within the model. The rst arises from
the asymmetric e¤ect on rank of income gains and losses. The upper tail of the log-normal
density is decreasing in income so in the neighbourhood of any income level, there exist
more agents with lower incomes than those with higher incomes. Therefore, the loss of
rank associated with a fall in income exceeds the gain in rank associated with an equivalent
rise in income. This observation is reversed for individuals in the lower tail, leading to the
prediction that loss aversion from relative concerns is systematically weaker for such agents
relative to those in the upper tail.9
A second source of loss aversion arises when the mean of the income distribution is
growing over time. In this case the income shock required to maintain a constant level of
experienced utility is strictly positive due to the presence of positional externalities: to stand
still is to fall behind. Since gains and losses are judged against the income growth rate rather
8When experienced utility corresponds to a weighted average of a concave absolute component and a
relative component, the resulting function is of the Friedman-Savage form (Friedman and Savage, 1948) for
some intermediate values of the weighting parameter. This parallels earlier derivations of the Friedman-
Savage formulation by Gregory (1980) and Robson (1992).
9Friedman (1989) o¤ers a derivation of the value function of prospect theory using Lelands (1988) no-
tion of approximate expected utility. His account also emphasises the role of a positively skewed income
distribution in the widespread generation of loss aversion.
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than zero, absolute losses are magnied when translated into relative losses, while absolute
gains are correspondingly diminished in relative terms.
A third source is inherent in the particular form of path dependence implied by the
dynamics of the frame of reference. When incomes are growing over time positive income
shocks are more prevalent than negative shocks. In our model, agents habituate to receiving
positive shocks, making negative shocks more painful when they arrive.10 To see this, note
that when successive income shocks alternate in sign only a single reference level adjusts. The
frame of reference does not shift, but stretches. However, when successive income shocks are
of the same sign the frame of reference shifts contemporaneously. Consequently, alternating
income shocks have a greater contemporaneous impact on utility than do same-sign shocks.
If the incidence of positive shocks exceeds that of negative shocks then negative shocks are
more likely be of alternate sign to the previous shock than are positive shocks.
Model complexity is such that these e¤ects do not summarise easily into a simple theo-
retical statement. Rather, the incidence of loss aversion depends in a complex way on all the
model parameters. Much the same can be said for the implied form of reference-contingence.
We therefore analyse these issues in a calibration of the model in the next section.
5. Calibration
Here we perform a calibration of the model. The parameters  and σ are tted to data from
Incomes Data Services on the distribution of UK gross weekly earnings of full-time employees
for April 2002. All income amounts are in Pounds Sterling. The median and mean of the
log-normal density are dened as ρt ≡ et and φt ≡ et+(σ
2t)/2 respectively. From these
we estimate t = 5.95 and σ
√
t = 0.62. We decompose t by assuming a long run income
growth rate of 2.5% ( = 0.025), which implies t = 238, and σ = 0.0402. The conclusion
of a large body of work by the Leyden group of economists into minimum income suggests
an elasticity of the lower reference level with current income of ηltYt = 0.6. Since ηltYt is
not constant in our model, we evaluate it at the modal income, in which case λ = 0.63.
Evaluating instead at the mean income yields λ = 0.46 and similar outcomes obtain.
Figures 2-4 depict the value function for di¤erent reference levels of income. Each is
drawn for εt−1 set at the mean value of 0.025. Although the value function intersects below
the origin, the e¤ect appears almost indiscernible.
The results suggest a widespread nding of loss aversion for incomes in the upper tail of
the income distribution. As the reference level of income increases, so does the range of εt for
which loss aversion holds. Therefore relative e¤ects generate loss aversion for those far from
the ruin point, where absolute utility e¤ects may be weak. There appear to be failures of
10The psychological notion of habituation refers to the decreasing response of an organism to a repeated
stimulus. This di¤ers slightly from adaptation, which instead refers to a maintained stimulus (Thompson
and Spencer, 1966).
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loss aversion at low reference income levels, and more generally for very large shocks relative
to income. However, it is at these lower incomes that absolute utility would be expected to
generate loss aversion were we to include an absolute component.
Turning to reference-contingency, Figures 2-4 show that in a neighbourhood on either
side of the reference level, non-linearity is decreasing with the reference income. That is, the
regions of signicant curvature in the value function become more distant from the refer-
ence level as income increases. This appears to be consistent with Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) who speculated that V () becomes more linear as the reference income increases.
However, the kink at the reference level of income becomes more pronounced with increases
in the reference income due to the increasing strength of loss aversion. There is an unfortu-
nate absence of empirical research on reference-contingence against which to evaluate these
theoretical predictions (Schmidt, 2003).
How do small variations in the other parameters alter our ndings? As regards loss aver-
sion, the e¤ect of increasing εt−1 is to increase the incidence of loss aversion, while decreasing
εt−1, or allowing it to be negative, decreases the incidence of loss aversion. Lowering λ has
the e¤ect of introducing progressively stronger thresholds into the value function. In these
cases, V () is initially steep around the reference income level, before attening quickly in
a region of high curvature. However, there are no substantial changes in respect of loss
aversion.
Finally, the occurrence of convex (concave) regions in the gain (loss) domain is severely
limited. For this calibration, a convex interval in the gain domain only exists for reference
incomes less than approximately $35, which accounts for less than 0.01% of the population.
A concave interval in the loss domain emerges only for reference incomes greater than around
$7000, which again a¤ects less than 0.01% of the population. Thus, in the overwhelming
majority of cases, we nd the principle of diminishing sensitivity to hold.
6. Conclusion
This paper has presented a model of cardinal utility based upon the two psychological notions
of self- and social-comparison. We have argued that such a model can go some way to
reconciling the Leyden IWF, time-series and cross-sectional ndings on SWB, and the value
function of prospect theory, within a single conceptual framework. In our model, utility
reects the distribution of income because agents care about their ranked position in the
income distribution. Utility approximating the log-normal distribution function emerges
because empirical income distributions are often approximately log-normal.
We have o¤ered an account of apparent paradoxes in well-being data without supposing
that individuals must have constant utility over the life-cycle. Instead we show how the zero-
sum properties of a rank lead naturally to constant average well-being for constant rates of
income growth. A testable prediction of the model is that time-trends in well-being should
emerge in periods with accelerating or de-accelerating economic growth rates.
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We argue that the value function of prospect theory corresponds to the transition dynam-
ics of income utility around its steady-state level. These dynamics are driven by stochastic
shocks to the income process. Di¤erent from Kahneman and Tverskys (1979) formalisation
of the value function, our value function is explicitly contingent on the reference level of
income at which it is drawn, since it describes the rst di¤erence of a utility function dened
on income levels. More empirical work on the nature of the reference-contingency is needed
before the merits of the model in this respect can be assessed.
However, our model is only a relatively modest beginning in attempting to explain the
phenomena we have discussed. An important development will be to recast the model in
the maximising framework common to economic analysis more generally. However, a better
economic understanding of behavioural features such as adaptation will be required before
such a development is feasible. Nevertheless, we hope to have shown what such a model
might be able to achieve.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let Y0 = 1 and Yt = (1+εt)Yt−1, where εt is iid across agents and
has a truncated normal distribution on the interval (−1,∞). Then log Yt is approximately
truncated normal on the interval (−t,∞) with mean t and variance σ2t. Thus Yt is truncated
log-normal on the interval (e−t,∞). Since in steady-state UE  Yt, LEt , HEt |εt = 0 = Ft (Yt),
the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. Using the denition of social welfare: WE|εt=0 =
R
Ut (Yt)
dFt (Yt) =
R
Ft (Yt) dFt (Yt) =
1
2
.
Proof of Proposition 3. We have Ft−1 (Yt−1) = Ft (Yt) so
∂lEt
∂εt
≷ 0 ⇔ ∂hEt
∂εt
≷ 0 ⇔ εt ≷ 0.
Suppose εt ≥ 0, then UE () = Yt−l
E
t−1
hEt −l
E
t−1
and UD () = Yt−lEt−1
hDt −l
E
t−1
. Since Yt > l
E
t ≥ lEt−1 it
follows that UD () > UE () ⇔ hEt > hDt . As all incomes are increasing it follows that
∂Ft(Y )
∂t
< 0, so Ft (Yt) < Ft−1 (Yt). Then h
E
t > h
D
t follows from (3) in the text. Now suppose
εt < 0 then U
E () = Yt−lEt
hEt−1−l
E
t
and UD () = Yt−lDt
hEt−1−l
D
t
. Since lEt > l
D
t , from (3) we have that
UD () > UE ()⇔ hEt−1 > Yt. This holds as hEt−1 > Yt−1 > Yt.
Proof of Proposition 4. We have Ft−1 (Yt−1) = Ft (Yt) so
∂lEt
∂εt
≷ 0 ⇔ ∂hEt
∂εt
≷ 0 ⇔ εt ≷ 0.
If Yt > Yt−1 experienced utility is given by U
E (|εt > 0) = Yt−l
E
t−1
hEt −l
E
t−1
. If Yt > Yt−1 then
experienced utility is UE (|εt = 0) = Yt−l
E
t
hEt −l
E
t
. So UE (|εt > 0) > UE (|εt = 0) ⇔ hEt > Yt,
and the r.h.s. holds by the denition of hEt . If Yt < Yt−1 we have U
E (|εt < 0) = Yt−l
E
t
hEt−1−l
E
t
.
Then UE (|εt = 0) > UE (|εt < 0)⇔ hEt < hEt−1, which holds for εt < 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. Noting that ∂
2V ()
∂ε2t
= ∂
2U()
∂ε2t
, assume εt ≥ 0 then UD
 
Yt, L
D
t , H
D
t

=
Yt−lEt−1
hDt −l
E
t−1
. It follows that
∂2U
∂ε2t
= 1
(hDt −lEt−1)
3
n
2
∂hDt
∂εt
h 
Yt − lEt−1
 ∂hDt
∂εt
−  hDt − lEt−1 ∂Yt∂εt
i
−  hDt − lEt−1  Yt − lEt−1 ∂2hDt∂ε2t
o
.
Using
∂hDt
∂εt
= Yt−1

1 + λ− λ

Ft−1 (Yt) + (1 + εt)
∂Ft−1 (Yt)
∂εt

,
∂2hDt
∂ε2t
= −λYt−1

2
∂Ft−1 (Yt)
∂εt
+ (1 + εt)
∂2Ft−1 (Yt)
∂ε2t

,
we may write this in the form λ

Yt−1
hDt −l
E
t−1
3  
a1λ
2 + b1λ+ c1

where
c1 = −2

1− Ft−1 (Yt) + εt∂Ft−1 (Yt)
∂εt

+ ε2t (1 + εt)
∂2Ft−1 (Yt)
∂ε2t
.
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Ignoring the trivial root λ = 0, the remaining two roots are λ1+ =
−b1+
√
b21−4a1c1
2a1
and
λ1− =
−b1−
√
b21−4a1c1
2a1
. Concavity requires that λ ∈ [λ1−, λ1+] if λ1+ > λ1−, and λ ≥ λ1− if
λ1− > λ1+. There exists a 0 < λ < 1 such that these conditions hold if λ1− < 0 and λ1+ > 0.
Both conditions are satised if c1 < 0. We have that at εt = 0, c1 = −2 (1− F (Yt)) < 0 for
all nite Y , which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. If εt < 0 then U
D
 
Yt, L
D
t , H
D
t

=
Yt−lDt
hEt−1−l
D
t
. In this case
∂2U
∂ε2t
= 1
(hEt−1−lDt )
3
n
2
∂lDt
∂εt
h 
hEt−1 − lDt

∂Yt
∂εt
−  hEt−1 − Yt ∂lDt∂εt
i
−  hEt−1 − lDt   hEt−1 − Yt ∂2lDt∂ε2t
o
.
Using
∂lDt
∂εt
=
∂hDt
∂εt
−λYt−1 and ∂
2lDt
∂ε2t
=
∂2hDt
∂ε2t
, we can write this as λ

Yt−1
hEt−1−l
D
t
3  
a2λ
2 + b2λ+ c2

,
where c2 = c1 + 2. Convexity requires that λ ∈ [λ2+, λ2−] for λ2− > λ2+ and λ ≥ λ2+ for
λ2+ > λ2−, where λ2+ and λ2− are dened analogous to λ1+ and λ1− above. The conditions
λ2− > 0 and λ2+ < 0 ensure that for all agents there exists a 0 < λ < 1 such that V () is
convex. Both conditions are satised if c2 > 0. Then lim
εt↑0
c2 = 2Ft−1 (Yt) > 0 for Y > 0,
which completes the proof.
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